A highly skewed microdata contains some sensitive attribute values that occur far more frequently than others. Such data violates the "eligibility condition" assumed by existing works for limiting the probability of linking an individual to a specific sensitive attribute value. Specifically, if the frequency of some sensitive attribute value is too high, publishing the sensitive attribute alone would lead to linking attacks. In many practical scenarios, however, this eligibility condition is violated.
Introduction
A person-specific microdata has the form T(QI, SA). QI is the quasi-identifier consisting of several public attributes (e.g., {birthdate, sex, Zip}) and SA is a sensitive attribute (e.g., Disease). Privacy is violated if it is possible to infer the value on SA of an individual via public knowledge on QI with a high probability [4] [23] . To limit this inference, a common defence is imposing diversity on the values of SA, called the l-diversity principle [5] . Informally, an anonymized table T* is l-diverse if, for any individual I with a record in T, the maximum frequency of SA values in the anonymity group for I is no more than 1/l, where the anonymity group is defined as the set of candidate records for I in T*. Generalization [12] and bucketization [6] are two approaches for anonymizing T into l-diverse T*. Both approaches are based on partitioning the records into anonymity groups.
Motivations
However, not every table T has an l-diverse T*. For example, if 80% of the records in T have the disease HIV, there is no 2-diverse T*. A necessary and sufficient condition for having an l-diverse T* is the eligibility condition [6] : no single SA value occurs in more than 1/l of the records in T. Let us call this condition l-eligibility. All previous works based on ldiversity assume that T satisfies l-eligibility. On the other hand, there are practical scenarios in which l-eligibility is violated. Let us consider several scenarios.
• Zipf's law distribution: Many man made and naturally occurring phenomena are distributed according to Zipf's law [18] : the frequency of an event is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table, or a small number of events are responsible for a large portion of occurrences. The same principle applies to microdata; therefore, it is not surpresing that certain sensitive attribute values (such as diseeas) are far more common than others.
• Incremental publishing: Typically data are published incrementally over a period of time [19] [20] [22] . According to the law of large numbers, a small size data has a large variance in various statistical properties. Specifically, the small incremental data at each timestamp tends to have more skewed sensitive attribute value distribution than the combined data over a larger time interval. For example, on the real life adverse drug reaction database 1 : if D [i] is published monthly, weekly and daily, we observed no violation of 6-eligibility, 4 % violation of 6-eligibility, and 30% violation of 6-eligibility, respectively.
• Small data size: Typically the published microdata is a small subset of records of an underlying database as a result of queries or sampling. For example, in the period of April 16 2003 -May 8 2003 , the average number of new Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) cases (including suspected cases) on each day is only 175. If each day's cases must be published separately, such as for temporal pattern analysis, the distribution on the sensitive attribute will be easily imbalanced.
Since previous work assumes l-eligibility, they do not provide a clue on how to publish l-eligibility violated T. In this paper, we consider the problem of restoring l-eligibility; once l-eligibility is restored, an existing method can be further applied to generate an l-diverse version. There are two key questions: how to restore l-eligibility while providing a privacy guarantee, how to restore l-eligibility with minimum modification to the data. Before answering these questions, we first consider several possible ways of restoring l-eligibility. In the following discussion, the term "non-dominant records" refers to records having infrequent SA values, and the term "dominant records" refers to records having the most frequent SA values.
Solution 1: Add fake records on non-dominant SA values One way is adding fake non-dominant records. Unfortunately, this approach leaves the most frequent sensitive values unchanged in the published data, which allows the attacker to infer the most frequent sensitive value in the original data T. In addition, this approach alters the statistics for non-dominant records. This may have a major impact on utility because non-dominant records often are the research target [16] .
Solution 2: Delete non-dominant records An alternative is removing non-dominant records. This approach has a similar limitation to the first approach.
Solution 3: Suppress some dominant records The third way is suppressing some dominant records. In many applications, especially data mining, suppressing some dominant records has very limited impact on the research target, which is usually about non-dominant records. For example, for a data set with 90% records having "Flu" and 10% records having "H1N1", the focus of the research is on classifying H1N1 patients. To obtain good classification results, often dominant records are under-sampled (i.e., suppressed) [15] .
In this paper, we consider suppressing dominant records to restore l-eligibility. At this point, it seems that we can minimally suppress dominant records until l-eligibility is restored. However, the next example shows that such suppression does not protect privacy.
Eligibility Attacks
Example 1 Figure 1 shows T with five sensitive values {S 1 :10, S 2 :4, S 3 :2, S 4 :1, S 5 :1}, ranked by the frequency. T violates 3-eligibility because 10>|T|/3=18/3, where |T| denotes the number of records in T. To restore 3-eligibility while minimizing the number of suppressed records, we iteratively suppress the records having the most frequent sensitive value. After suppressing 6 records for S 1 , T P in the center satisfies 3-eligibility for the first time. S i ' denotes the i th frequent sensitive value in T P . With T P satisfying 3-eligibility, T P can now be anonymized by any existing method to achieve 3-diversity. The set of suppressed records T S is withheld from publication. ■ Figure 1 An example of minimum suppression
However, given T P and the knowledge about the suppression algorithm used, an adversary can infer that only the two most frequent values S 1 ' and S 2 ' in T P can possibly be the most frequent value S 1 in the original T. Suppose that the adversary also knows that T violates 3-eligibility, for example, by being told that some records are suppressed (for the purpose of validating the usefulness of data), which happens only if T violates 3-eligibility. Therefore, the adversary learns that one of S 1 ' and S 2 ' must have a frequency higher than 1/3 in T. This imposes a privacy threat for all individuals with a record in T.
The root of the above attack is the minimality of suppression for producing T P , which leaves a small number of candidates for the most frequent sensitive value S 1 . The term eligibility attack refers to such inference of S 1 from a published subset T P .
Contributions
We consider the following l-dichotomy problem. Given an leligibility violated base table T, let S 1 denote the most frequent SA value in T. We want to determine a partition {T P , T S } of T, where T P is for publication and T S is suppressed, such that the following conditions hold.
• Privacy: T P is l-eligible and, for every sensitive value S i ' in T P , the posterior probability of S i '=S 1 , given T P and K, is bounded by 1/l. K denotes the knowledge about the algorithm for producing {T P , T S }.
• Utility: The number of records in T P is maximized while satisfying the above privacy requirement. Since our approach is suppressing dominant records, this optimality minimizes the suppression of dominant records.
The above problem has several novelties. First, it considers an l-eligibility violated base table T. To our knowledge, anonymzing such microdata has not been considered previously. Second, it considers the knowledge about the algorithm that produces T P . With such knowledge, l-eligibility of T P alone is not sufficient, as illustrated by Example 1. Third, once l-eligibility is enforced on T P , existing methods such as [5] [6] can be applied to render T P ldiverse. In this sense, our work makes existing works applicable to skewed data.
The contributions of this work are as follows. We formulate the l-dichotomy problem (Section 2). We introduce two deterministic solutions (Section 3): one provides a lower bound on suppression but no privacy guarantee, and one guarantees privacy but suppresses too much data. Then, we propose a randomized solution (Section 4). We show that this solution has the least expected suppression in a large family of randomized algorithms (Section 5), and has a suppression approaching the lower bound (Section 6).
Related Work
We adopt the l-diversity [5] as the privacy notion. Previous works assume that the global distribution satisfies the special l-eligibility condition [6] , and the focus is on limiting sensitive inference arising from the local distribution of anonymity groups. In the case that l-eligibility condition is not satisfied, no l-diverse table is produced. The work in [3] measures the privacy by the difference between local distribution and the global distribution. Thus a skewed global distribution is not considered sensitive. We consider a skewed global distribution on SA a privacy threat and have to deal with how to publish data with such distribution.
Our work is related to privacy threats due to background knowledge such as [5] [9] [10] . The background knowledge previously considered is primarily additional information about QI and SA. We consider background knowledge about the algorithm used for producing T P and the knowledge about the violation of l-eligibility of the base table T. Such knowledge cannot be easily handled by previous works.
The recent work in [7] dealt with attacks arising from minimality principles of anonymization algorithms. The motivations, assumptions, attacks, and problems in their work are different from ours. For example, [7] assumes that the global distribution satisfies the l-eligibility condition and deals with minimality attacks that arise from the anonymization for achieving l-diversity. We assume that the l-eligibility is violated and deal with eligibility attacks that arise from the skewness of global distribution on SA.
Record suppression has been used to protect privacy previously [11] [12][13] [14] . In those works, records are suppressed because they are "outliers" for k-anonymity. In our works, records are suppressed because their sensitive values are too frequent.
Problem Statement
The base table T has several quasi-identifying attributes (QI) and one sensitive attribute SA. SA has m distinct sensitive values S 1 ,…,S m with the frequency order F 1 ≥…≥F m >0 (in the number of records). S i is the i th frequent SA value in T and has the i th rank. Table 1 summarizes the notations used in this paper.
T is l-eligible if no more than |T|/l of the records shares a common SA value, i.e., F 1 ≤|T|/l. A violating value refers to S i with F i >|T|/l. We assume l≤m. Anonymized table T* consists of several anonymity groups, obtained by generalization [12] or bucketization [6] . T* satisfies ldiversity, or is l-diverse [5] , if for every anonymity group g in T*, the maximum frequency of any SA value in g is no more than 1/l. Note that l-eligibility of T coincides with l-diversity of T* if T* has a single anonymity group.
l-eligibility of T is both necessary and sufficient for T to have an l-eligible T* [5] [6] . If T violates l-eligibility, existing works cannot be applied to produce l-eligible T*. For this reason, existing works assume that T satisfies l-eligibility. In this paper, we consider T that violates l-eligibility. Suppose that T violates l-eligibility, i.e., F 1 >|T|/l. We want to determine a partition {T P ,T S } of T (i.e., T= T P ∪T S and T P ∩T S =∅) such that T P is l-eligible and is for publication and T S is withheld from publication. Let S 1 ',…,S m ' denote the SA values in T P with their frequency order F 1 Adversary Knowledge The attacker has access to the published T P , therefore, knows the rank S 1 ',…,S m ' in T P with F 1 '≥….≥ F m '. But the attacker has no access to T or T S . The attacker has the following knowledge, denoted by K.
The algorithm used to produce T P .  K2: |T|. In practice, the researcher may be told the number of records suppressed, i.e., |T S |, for validating the usefulness of data. Therefore, the original size |T| is likely public. From |T|>|T P |, the adversary also knows that the original data T is not l-eligible (i.e., F 1 >|T|/l), otherwise, |T|=|T P |.
As for the knowledge on the most frequent sensitive value S 1 in T, there are two cases. In the first case, the adversary knows S 1 in T before any data is published. In this case, even when no data is published, the adversary can infer S 1 with a probability higher than 1/l; thus, no method can provide protection. In the second case, the attacker does not know the most frequent sensitive value S 1 in T before seeing T P . The attack occurs when the attacker can infer S i '=S 1 (i.e., some value S i ' in T P is S 1 ) after seeing the published T P . This is the case we consider in this paper. We denote this posterior probability by Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P , K). Our goal is to limit Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P , K) while publishing as many non-dominant records as possible. We formalize this problem below. Definition 1 (l-Dichotomy) Consider an l-eligibility violated T and a partition {T P , T S } of T. Let S 1 denote the most frequent SA value in T. We say that (T P , K) satisfies ldichotomy if both of the following conditions hold:
 P-Eligibility: F 1 '≤|T P |/l, that is, T P is l-eligible. The term "P-Eligibility" comes from the fact that this condition is on the published table T P .
The term "S-Ambiguity" comes from the fact that this condition is on the suppression algorithm. The l-dichotomy problem is to find a partition {T P ,T S } such that (T P ,K) satisfies l-dichotomy, and as many non-dominant records as possible are published in T P .■
The definition of S-Ambiguity does not suggest an efficient test of the condition. To address this problem, we consider an implied condition that can be tested efficiently. Consider an l-eligibility violated T, i.e., F 1 >|T|/l, and a partition {T P , T S } of T. If S i ' is S 1 , F i '+|T S |≥F 1 , because the frequency of S 1 in T S is no more than |T S | and the frequency of S 1 in T P is equal to F i '. Therefore, to provide S-Ambiguity, there must exist at least l candidates S i ' such that F i '+|T S |>|T|/l; otherwise fewer than l values S i ' can possibly be S 1 , which implies Pr(S i '=S 1 | T P , K)>1/l. Since F 1 '≥…≥ F l '≥…≥ F m ', this condition is stated as the l-candidacy condition below.
Definition 2 (l-Candidacy) We say that (T P , K) satisfies l-candidacy if F l '+|T S |>|T|/l. ■ From the above discussion, S-Ambiguity implies lcandidacy. The converse is not true. (T P ,K) in Example 1 with l=3 provides a counter-example. (T P ,K) satisfies lcandidacy because F l '+|T S |=2+6>|T|/l =18/3. However, as in Example 1, (T P ,K) violates S-Ambiguity.
Corollary 1 S-Ambiguity implies l-candidacy. The converse is not true. ■ P-Eligibility states that the most frequent sensitive value S 1 ' in T P is not too frequent, whereas l-candidacy says that the next l-1 frequent values in T P , i.e., S 2 ',…,S l ', are not too infrequent (otherwise they will be disqualified for being S 1 ). We will show that, for the randomized algorithm in Section 4, l-candidacy and P-Eligibility together will guarantee SAmbiguity.
Deterministic Suppression
The deterministic suppression in Example 1 always suppresses a record for the most frequent value S 1 ' in T P , which minimizes the number of suppressed records for satisfying P-Eligibility. On the other hand, it is this minimality that compromises S-Ambiguity, as illustrated in that example. Nevertheless, this deterministic suppression serves an important building block in our randomized algorithm and provides a lower bound on suppression for achieving S-Ambiguity. In this section, we present a formal analysis of this deterministic suppression.
Consider a record r in T P having the value S i '. The level of r refers to the frequency F i ' of S i ' in T P (in number of records). The level of T P refers to the highest level of the records in T P , i.e., F 1 '. top(T P ) denotes the set of distinct sensitive values in T P that have the highest level in T P . Figure 2 presents the general form of the deterministic suppression, called D-suppression. Starting with T P =T, Dsuppression iteratively suppresses a record for a sensitive value in top(T P ), the lowest rank first if there are more than one value. In other words, it always suppresses a record having the highest frequency in T P . The suppressed records are contained in T S . We will consider several stop conditions shortly.
D-suppression

Figure 2 D-suppression
Example 2 Consider T in Figure 1 . Initialize T P to T and top(T P )={S 1 }. After suppressing 6 records for S 1 , T P is at level 4 and top(T P )={S 1 ,S 2 }. Then D-suppression suppresses one record for S 2 because S 2 has a lower rank than S 1 in T, and then suppresses one record for S 1 because top(T P )={S 1 }.
■
We say that an algorithm stops at a level F if T P produced is at the level F, i.e., F 1 '=F; an algorithm stops at the start of a level F if it stops at the level F without suppressing any record at the level F.
Property 1 Consider T P during the course of Dsuppression, 1. (Order Preservation) D-suppression preserves the "≥" order of frequency in T. As a result, S 1 is always contained in top(T P ). Therefore, for every S i '∈top(T P ), Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P ,K)=1/|top(T P )|, and for every S i '∉ top(T P ), Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P ,K)=0. 2. (Least Suppression) D-suppression stopping at the start of the level F has the least suppression among all algorithms stopping at the level F.
D-suppression:
Input: l-eligibility violated T. Initialize T P to T and initialize T S to ∅. While Stopping condition not true do Choose S j from top(T P ) Move one record for S j from T p to T S.
From Property 1(1), S-Ambiguity is compromised if Dsuppression stops with |top(T P )|<l. From Property 1 Property 1(2), D-suppression has the least suppression among all algorithms stopping at the same level. This property allows us to obtain a lower bound on the number of suppressed records for the deterministic suppression. Below, we identify two interesting stopping conditions of Dsuppression.
Safe D-Suppression
Safe D-suppression refers to D-suppression that stops when the combination of P-Eligibility and S-Ambiguity is achieved for the first time. Let F Safe and X Safe denote the level of T P and the suppression when Safe D-suppression stops. The next theorem tells that Safe D-suppression always stops at the start of the level F l .
Theorem 1 (Safe D-suppression) Safe D-suppression stops at the start of the level F l , i.e., F Safe = F l .■ Proof: We show that the start of the level F l is the first time where the combination of P-Eligibility and S-Ambiguity is achieved. From Property 1(1), Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P ,K) =1/|top(T P )|. Consider the T P produced when D-suppression stops at the start of the level F l . At this point, all of S 1 ,…,S l are suppressed to the level F l , thus top(T P ) contains S 1 ,…, S l and Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P ,K)≤ 1/l, so S-Ambiguity is satisfied. Also, |T P |= l×F l +∑ i>l F i , thus F l ≤ |T P |/l, so P-Eligibility is satisfied. At any level above F l , top(T P ) contains at most S 1 ,…, S l-1 , so |top(T P )|<l, from Property 1(1), S-Ambiguity is not satisfied. Safe D-suppression achieves S-Ambiguity by suppressing all of the l most frequent values S 1 ,…,S l to the frequency F l . For a small F l and a large l, this will suppress too many records. In Example 1, with l=3, this means suppressing 8 records for S 1 and 2 records for S 2 , which is more than half of the data. Although Safe D-suppression provides a solution, it loses too much information.
Unsafe D-suppression
Unsafe D-suppression refers to D-suppression that stops when the combination of P-Eligibility and l-candidacy is achieved for the first time. Let F Unsafe denote the level when Unsafe D-suppression stops and X Unsafe denote the suppression by Unsafe D-suppression.
Example 3 Consider D-suppression on T in Figure 1 with l =3. After suppressing 5 records for S 1 , l-candidacy is achieved for the first time: F 3 '+|T S |=2+5>|T|/l=18/3. After suppressing one more record for S 1 , P-Eligibility is achieved for the first time at the start of level 4. Unsafe D-suppression stops right here with F Unsafe = 4 and X Unsafe =6. S-Ambiguity is not satisfied until D-suppression continues to the start of the level F 3 =2. This is where Safe D-suppression stops, with F Safe =2 and X Safe =10. ■
Theorem 2 (Unsafe D-suppression)
The suppression by any algorithm that achieves both P-Eligibility and lcandidacy is at least X Unsafe .■ Proof: D-suppression always suppresses the record at the highest level in T P in each iteration. Such suppression most effectively reduces the level F 1 ' of T P for achieving PEligibility F 1 '≤|T P |/l. Also, such suppression leaves F l ' at the highest possible level for a given suppression size |T S |, thus requires the least suppression |T S | to achieve l-candidacy F l '+|T S |>|T|/l.
Recall that S-Ambiguity implies l-candidacy (Corollary 1). Therefore, from Theorem 2, Unsafe D-suppression provides a lower bound on suppression for achieving l-dichotomy, that is, no algorithm for achieving l-dichotomy can have less suppression than Unsafe D-suppression. A solution is considered interesting if its suppression approaches this lower bound and is much less than the suppression of Safe Dsuppression. Note that Unsafe D-suppression does not provide a solution because it does not guarantee S-Ambiguity (Example 3). In Section 4, we shall show that Unsafe Dsuppression provide S-Ambiguity when it is used by a randomized algorithm.
Randomized Suppression
Safe D-suppression guarantees l-dichotomy at the cost of suppressing all of S 1 ,…,S l to the level F l . Unsafe Dsuppression has a small suppression but fails to achieve SAmbiguity. The problem with both is their deterministic nature of suppression, which leads to either excessive suppression or a clue left on T P to infer S 1 . We now address this problem addressed by introducing randomness into the suppression of S 1 . In this section, we present such a randomized algorithm, R-suppression. In Section 5, we show that R-suppression has the least suppression in a large family of randomized algorithms.
R-suppression
R-suppression has two steps. In the first step, it suppresses S 1 to a random level. In the second step, it suppresses records deterministically to achieve l-dichotomy like Unsafe Dsuppression. This algorithm is given in Figure 3 .
STEP-1 (Randomization Step) suppresses S 1 randomly so that, after the suppression, any of the most frequent values S 1 ',…,S l ' on T P can possibly be S 1 with a bounded probability. Specifically, it picks a random number h from 1..l and then suppresses S 1 to a random level F chosen uniformly from the interval [F h+1 , F h ]. After the suppression, S 1 becomes S h ' on T P . The probability for picking h is equal to 1/l. The uniform distribution of F in [F h+1 , F h ] ensures that the attacker gains no new information from where S 1 is likely to be suppressed to in the interval [F h+1 , F h ].
STEP-2 (Deterministic
Step) calls for D-suppression to suppress more records from T P to achieve P-Eligibility and lcandidacy. Two questions about R-suppression must be answered. First, are P-Eligibility and l-candidacy in STEP-2 sufficient for achieving l-dichotomy? We will show in Section 4.2 that, with the randomization in STEP-1, the answer is yes. Second, does R-suppression provide the least suppression among randomized solutions? We will present a proof of this optimality in Section 5.
l-Dichotomy of R-suppression
We show that R-suppression achieves P-Eligibility and SAmbiguity (therefore, l-dichotomy). P-Eligibility is enforced in STEP-2. We focus on S-Ambiguity. Prior to the proof, we first illustrate how Pr(S i '=S 1 |T P ,K) is determined from the adversary's point of view, T P and K.
Example 5 Continue with T={S 1 :10, S 2 :4, S 3 :2, S 4 :1, S 5 :1} and T P ={S 1 ':3, S 2 ':3, S 3 ':2, S 4 ':1, S 5 ':1} in Example 4. Recall that the adversary has access to T P , not T. With the knowledge K, the adversary knows |T|-|T P |=8 records are suppressed. Any base table B that is consistent with the knowledge K and the observed T P would be "plausible". From the knowledge on R-suppression, S 1 is among the three most frequent values in T P . This means that the 8 suppressed records can have any distribution of S 1 ', S 2 ' and S 3 '.
For example, one plausible base table is B={S 1 ':11, S 2 ':3, S 3 ':2, S 4 ':1, S 5 ':1}, assuming that all 8 suppressed records have S 1 '. For this B, S 1 '=S 1 . Given this B, R-suppression can produce the observed T P by choosing h=1 and any F∈ [3, 11] .
Similarly, by assuming that all 8 suppressed records have S 2 ', there is another plausible base table B in which S 2 '=S 1 . The third plausible base table B is {S 3 ':10, S 1 ':3, S 2 ':3, S 4 ':1, S 5 ':1}, assuming that all 8 suppressed records have S 3 '. However, S 1 cannot be S 4 ' because S 1 must be among the three most frequent values in T P .
Since all these reconstructions of the base table are plausible, the adversary cannot exclude any of S 1 ', S 2 ' and S 3 ' as the candidate of S 1 . Without further information, the adversary cannot tell which reconstruction is more likely. Therefore, Pr( S i '=S 1 |Tp, K) = 1/3, where i=1,2,3. ■ Theorem 3 (l-Dichotomy of R-suppression) For T P produced by R-suppression, (T P ,K) satisfies P-Eligibility and S-Ambiguity (thus, l-dichotomy).■
The proof is given in Appendix.
Optimality Of R-Suppression
We show that R-suppression has the least expected suppression in a large family of randomized algorithms, called R*-suppression family. This family contains all randomized algorithms that randomize the suppression of S 1 in the first step and deterministically suppress more records to satisfy l-dichotomy in the second step. The members vary in the specific procedures used in each step. R*-suppression is obtained from R-suppression in Figure 3 with the following modifications: STEP-1: pick an integer h from 1..m (instead of 1..l) at random with probability ≤ 1/l (which is possible because m≥l). This step bounds the probability of S 1 =S h ' on T P by 1/l, for h=1..m. Any special case under this constraint gives rise to an instance of this step. For example, STEP-1 of Rsuppression is the special case where h is picked from 1..l with the equal probability 1/l. STEP-2: replace "D-suppression" with "any deterministic suppression algorithm" and replace "P-Eligibility and lcandidacy" with "l-dichotomy". Any choice of a deterministic algorithm gives rise to an instance. For example, R-suppression chooses D-suppression.
Each combination of the choices in STEP-1 and STEP-2 gives rise to a member in the R*-suppression family. Obviously, R-suppression is a member in this family.
Since R is a randomized algorithm, its execution is on an random instance. Let R i denote the random instance of Rsuppression with i being the initial suppression of S 1 at STEP-1, i.e. i= F 1 −F where F is the level for S 1 chosen in STEP-1. Let X i be the total suppression by R i in the two steps. Let X be the random variables for X i , and E(X) be the expected value of X, respectively. Similarly, R i *, X i *, X and E(X*) denote the counterparts for R*-suppression.
Theorem 4 (Optimality of R-suppression) E(X)≤E(X*). That is, R-suppression has the least expected suppression in the R*-Suppression family. ■ Proof: The intuition is that R-suppression has a higher probability for a smaller initial suppression of S 1 in STEP-1 R-suppression: Input: l-eligibility violated T, and l. Output: T P . STEP-1: Let T P be T. (1) Pick an integer h from 1..l at random with equal probability 1/l. (2) Pick a level F at random uniformly from [F h+1 , F h ]. (3) Suppress S 1 to the level F on T P . STEP-2: Apply D-suppression to T P and stop when (T P ,K) satisfies P-Eligibility and l-candidacy for the first time. Return T P .
and maximally relies on the most effective D-suppression in STEP-2 to achieve P-Eligibility and l-candidacy. More formally, for any initial suppression i of S 1 in STEP-1, if i≤F 1 -F l+1 , Pr(R i )≥Pr(R i *), and if i> F 1 -F l+1 , Pr(R i )=0. From Theorem 2, for every initial suppression i in STEP 1, we have X i ≤X i *. Note Σ i Pr(R i )= Σ i Pr(R i *)=1. Together, these imply Σ i Pr(R i )×X i ≤ Σ i Pr(R i *) ×X i *, thus E(X)≤E(X*).
Empirical Study
In this section, we evaluated the suppression of Rsuppression empirically on both real life data and typical data distributions. For a given solution {T P ,T S }, we measure the distortion by Suppression Rate defined as |T S |/|T|, i.e., the percentage of records suppressed, where |T|=|T P |+|T S |. Since our approach prefers suppressing records for dominant sensitive values (except for the random suppression of S 1 in STEP-1) and we assume that records for non-dominant sensitive values have more utility, the suppression rate reflects the amount of dominant records suppressed. The smaller the suppression rate, the more records for nondominant records can be published. We compare the following suppression methods.  Safe D -Safe D-suppression, which provides a valid solution to the l-dichotomy problem.  Unsafe D -Unsafe D-suppression, which provides a lower bound on suppression for the l-dichotomy problem (Theorem 2).  R-sup -R-suppression. This is the proposed solution to the l-dichotomy problem. We report the average of 100 random instances for R-suppression. We do not evaluate other members in the R*-suppression family as R-sup has the least expected suppression in this family (Theorem 4). We use Safe D and Unsafe D as references. R-sup is effective if its suppression rate approaches the lower bound of Unsafe D and is much lower than the suppression rate of Safe D. We conducted two experiments, one on real life data (Section 6.1) and one on two representative data distributions (Section 6.2). All experiments were implemented in C++ and run on a PC with 2.4GHz CPU, 512M memory and Windows XP.
Sample based Publishing
The first experiment simulates incremental data publishing by a series of samples drawn from the base population adapted from the real life data set Adults from UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [1] . This data contains personspecific records from the US Census, collected from real life US demographics, and has been used as a de facto benchmark [14] . After removing records with missing values, the resulting data contains 30,162 records. On the conservative side, we selected the "Occupation" as SA because it is the least skewed attribute (see Figure 4) . SA has 14 distinct values with the most frequent value having the relative frequency of 13.4%. Thus, there is no violation of leligibility in the base population for l=6.
Figure 4 Attribute value distribution (value vs frequency)
Samples violating l-eligibility First, we examine how often l-eligibility is violated by a sample drawn from the Adult population. For a given sample size p (in fraction), we take 100 samples from the Adult data set. Each sample T has the size |T|= p×|Adult| and is taken by simple random sampling without replacement. T is a violating sample if T does not satisfy l-eligibility. Figure 5 plots the number of violating samples among 100 samples, for each pair of p and l values.
Figure 5 Eligibility violations vs p and l
For a fixed l (i.e., the same color), with a small sample size p, the distribution of values on SA is skewed and there are more violating samples. For a fixed sample size p, a larger l sets a harder eligibility condition to satisfy, thus leads to more violating samples. For example, at p=0.5% or 150 records, the percentage of violating samples is as high as 40% for l=6. Such small sample size is likely for the reasons discussed in Section 1.1. Interestingly, these violations happen on samples though the underlying Adult data set as a whole does not violate l-eligibility for l=6. This result verifies our claim in Section 1.1 that l-eligibility is violated as the sample size decreases.
We should mention that the Adult data set is only moderately skewed with the highest frequency being 13.4%. A typical distribution like those following Zipf's law can be much more skewed (see Section 6.2). In those cases, we expect a more frequent violation of l-eligibility.
Suppression Rate For each violating sample, we apply the above mentioned methods to study suppression rate. For the purpose of reference, we also include the distortion of suppressing all records in a sample if the sample violates leligibility, denoted by "Suppress-All". In fact, this is the "state-of-the-art" solution given that existing works consider only the case that l-eligibility is satisfied.
For each setting of p and l, we compute the averaged suppression rate, (Σ i SR i )/n, where SR i represents the suppression rate of a violating sample i, and n is the total number of samples, which is 100 in our experiment. Intuitively, the averaged suppression rate is the percentage of data suppressed over all samples. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the averaged suppression rate vs p and l, respectively. In both Figure 6 and Figure 7 , an outstanding trend is that R-sup suppresses only slightly more than the lower bound of Unsafe D for all p and l tested. Take the setting of p=0.5% and l=6 as an example. R-sup suppresses less than 3% records on each sample (on average), which is nearly identical to the suppression of Unsafe D. This result is encouraging in that Unsafe D serves a lower bound for achieving P-Eligibility and l-candidacy, which are necessary (but not sufficient) for achieving l-dichotomy. R-sup approaches this lower bound while guaranteeing the stronger l-dichotomy.
On the other hand, R-sup suppresses much less than Safe D. For example, for the same setting of p=0.5% and l=6, Safe D suppresses more than 10% records of each sample (on average). And suppression goes up quickly for a smaller p and a larger l. This result confirms our expectation that Safe D's naïve suppression to the level F l loses too much data. Suppress-All is far worse than all other approaches.
Zipf Distributions
Besides real life data, we also consider some well-known data distributions. Many types of data studied in physical and social science follow Zipf's law. In this experiment, we assume that the frequency F i of sensitive values on SA follows this law: F i =β/i α , where β>0 and α>0, i=1,…,m, where m is the number of distinct sensitive values. β, which is equal to F 1 , determines the scale of frequency but has little impact on the (relative) suppression rate. α determines the decreasing rate of F i and is a major factor for eligibility violation. We use the default setting β=1000, α=1.0 and l=5. m=20.
(a) vary α (l=5) (b) vary l (α=1) Figure 8(b) shows suppression rate vs l. Again, R-sup stays close to the lower bound of Unsafe D-sup and has much less suppression than Safe D. Interestingly, when l is increased from 4 to 6, suppression rate of Unsafe D decreases. This is because l-candidacy |T S |+F l '>|T|/l requires less suppression when l increases, for a small l. However, when l is increased from 6 to 10, suppression rate increases because P-Eligibility F 1 ' ≤|T P |/l dominates in this case. We also conducted experiments on linear distributions, but due to the space, the results are omitted. In general, we observed a similar trend as that on Zipf distribution, except that there are less eligibility violations and consequently require less suppression than the case of Zipf distribution.
Conclusions
To provide the protection of l-diversity, existing works assumes that the global distribution of sensitive values is not skewed. In several real life scenarios, this assumption is violated. In this work, we show that publishing a maximum leligible subset may lead to the inference of the most frequent sensitive value in the original data, called eligibility attacks. We formulated the problem of preventing eligibility attacks while allowing more data for publication. We proposed a simple but effective randomized solution to this problem, i.e., R-suppression. R-suppression has the least expected suppression among a large family of randomized algorithms.
